Talk:Romanian War of Independence

Result

Result "Russian victory" should be changed to "Ruso-Romanian victory" since Romania played an important part in this war. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.208.174.72 (talk) 19:27, 6 July 2008 (UTC)

Yeah right! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 188.24.231.11 (talk) 14:03, 26 April 2014 (UTC)

Cut from article

At the end of the article it said " (Russia did not keep its promises of the April 1877 treaty with Romania)." This may be true, or it may not, but without some substantiation of what promises were broken, it is useless, so I have cut it. I'd welcome a return, with some substance. -- Jmabel | Talk 01:40, Jan 6, 2005 (UTC)

I wrote about the treaty in the article: The 4 April (...) Romania and Russia signed at Bucharest a treaty under which (...) Russia respect the integrity of Romania. Bogdan | Talk 09:08, 6 Jan 2005 (UTC)

And in what respect were these promises broken? -- Jmabel | Talk 19:25, Jan 6, 2005 (UTC)

That territory was previously administred by Romania, but they were claimed by Russia (the rest of Bessarabia was already in Russian administration). The Romanian representatives were not even allowed to participate the negotiations between Ottoman Empire and Russia. Bogdan | Talk 19:47, 6 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Aha! now I understand what you are trying to say. I'll put it in the article more clearly. -- Jmabel | Talk 22:55, Jan 6, 2005 (UTC)

Merge with Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78

The article should be merged with Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78, as both article treat the same events, albeit from nationalistic points of view. I also place a NPOV tag here, for such phrases as Carol I accepted, and became the commander of both the Romanian and Russian troops, conquering Plevna after heavy fighting are just plain laughable. Perhaps the Plevna Monument on the New Square in Moscow honours Carol I? I believe the Russians, Turks and Bulgarians would be amazed to learn that Pleven was taken by the Romanians. --Ghirlandajo 14:06, 4 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Judge yourself! The Plevna Delay Winchesters and Peabody-Martinis in the Russo-Turkish War

A small Turkish army is trapped, but with the help of surprising firepower, they hold up the entire Russian Campaign for over five months.

by Richard T. Trenk, Sr.

(Originally published in Man At Arms Magazine, Volume 19, Number Four, August, 1997) (copyright Man at Arms, 1997, used with kind Permission of Man At Arms)

As Field Marshal Osman Pasha lay wounded in a small peasant cottage, surrendering his Turkish forces to General Ganetsky, the Russian general ordered his interpreter to say that he much admired the brilliant tactics and defensive positions that the outnumbered Turk had employed for over five months. General Ganetsky then shook the hand of the man who had held up a combined Russian and Romanian army, inflicting horrendous casualties rivaling those at the Antietam, Shiloh and Wilderness battles of the American Civil War. Lt. Gen. Skobeleff, whose brigades were among the first to suffer massive losses at the hands of Osman Pasha's forces said, "He is the greatest general of the age, for he has saved the honor of his country. I will offer him my hand and tell him so personally." The year was 1877, and the Russians were in the midst of their 12th conflict (since 1676) with the Ottoman Empire. Osman Pasha, with 15,000 men and 174 modern Krupp artillery pieces, had been on his way to bolster Turkish forces at Nikopolis in Bulgaria. Upon learning that the Turks at Nikopolis had surrendered, he quickly marched his small army to the town of Plevna (modern name, Pleven), which is located 75 miles southwest of Bucharest. Russian intelligence completely failed to notice this force and had no idea that it was now located at Plevna, busily constructing trenches, redoubts, fortifications and gun emplacements that would soon baffle the Russian generals and, at the same time, introduce the repeating rifle into European warfare. Standard Turkish practice was to mark off the yardage on anticipated battlefields using sticks with ribbons attached, or recording the distance to natural objects such as trees, rocks or other visible objects. At Plevna, Osman Pasha had plenty of time to do all this measuring and marking, and it soon paid off in Russian casualties.

Oliver F. Winchester had sent fancy .44 caliber Model 1866 Winchester rifles to selected Turkish officers and politicians, and this gift giving finally resulted in a small order being received in 1869. Tests showed that ordinary Turkish soldiers could easily learn to load and fire this lever action rifle very quickly. In 1870 and 1871, the Turkish government placed additional orders totaling 5,000 carbines and 45,000 muskets with bayonets.

Factory records do not indicate how much ammunition the Turks purchased, but based upon various battle accounts that describe long periods of constant firing, it would appear that the Turks purchased at least 40,000,000 and as much as 60,000,000 rounds from Winchester. After the final Turkish surrender in 1878, the Russians reported that they had captured 500,000,000 rounds of all calibres! While this may have been an exaggeration, there is no doubt that Turkish tactics required a massive amount of rifle ammo, and soldiers were, in fact, issued large amounts of cartridges and encouraged to shoot as much as possible. By way of comparison, a German army corps of that era would have been sent into battle with 4,500,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. The exact number of Winchester Model '66s that Osman had on hand has not been recorded, but based upon the results, he employed at least 8,000 and as many as 12,000.

The standard Turkish infantry rifle was the American-designed Peabody-Martini falling-block rifle in .45 caliber. This was not only a fast shooting rifle (tests produced 17 aimed shots per minute) but was also very accurate out to 700 yards, and loaded with most small bore, large capac­ity black powder cartridges, it would carry several thousand yards with a high looping trajectory. (For more information about these weapons, see "The Turkish Connection: The Saga of the Peabody-Martini Rifle" by William O. Achtermeier, Man at Arms, Volume 1, Number 2, pp. 12-21, 55­57.) The Russian infantry was equipped with the obsolete .60 cal. Krenk (Bohemian spelling, Krnka). Their rifle brigades used the more modern American designed .42 cal. Berdan rifle.

On July 18th, 1877, 1,500 Russian cavalry were reconnoitering around Plevna. They clashed with a small number of Turkish skirmishers and, thinking the town itself was light­ly defended, reported back to their leader, Lt. Gen. Schilder-Schuldner, who decided to send his entire force of 7,500 infantry to occupy the town on July 20th after sever­al hours of cannon fire.

Small numbers of Turks in trenches were easily over­come and allowed to flee. Resistance seemed to have ended. The Russian infantry walked right into the town, acting like visiting tourists. Osman Pasha, who had carefully concealed his main force inside houses and barns and behind other sheltered locations, allowed the Russians to enter the town in considerable numbers before springing the trap. With a bugle signal, the Turks revealed themselves and began pouring massive rifle fire into the startled Russians. Only a small number of those who made it into Plevna man­aged to escape the town. Their leader, Maj. Gen. Knorring, fell as did the commander of the Archangel Rgt., Col. Rosenbaum. At virtually point-blank range, the Winchesters had poured out the majority of the bullets, and the Peabody-Martinis kept up a lingering long-range fire upon the retreating Russians. Turkish losses were only 12 killed and 30 wounded. In this first battle at Plevna. Russian losses amounted to 74 officers and 2,771 men who fell in a fire fight that lasted only 15-20 minutes. They left behind on the field 17 wagons of ammunition.

The Grand Duke Nicholas was commander in chief of the Russian army (see note on the Russian Imperial family, below). He and his General Staff realized that his army could not bypass Osman Pasha's forces (which, in a few days. received another 5,000 men). A force this large, equipped with the longer ranging Krupp artillery, could play havoc with communications and supply lines. He ordered Lt.Gen. Baron Krudner, who commanded the right wing of the Russian armies, to take his IX Corps, reinforced with a brigade of the XI Corps and a full division of the IV Corps, to Plevna to eliminate this rascal who dared to block his path.

In 1877 a Russian army corps normally had 25,000 men, but many units were understrength, so Krudner also received what would later prove to be a mobile disaster, in the person of Lt. Gen. Prince Schachowskoi, who was commander of the 11th Army Corps. When the Prince arrived with one infantry and one cavalry brigade, he had already established a reputation for wild and foolish tactics, which sometimes succeeded and some­times failed, but always at the cost of lives and equipment.

The Turkish General Staff at Sophia was overjoyed at the unexpected success that Osman Pasha had provided them. By July 22nd. they had brought his forces at Plevna up to 45,000 effectives and added to the number of Winchesters on hand.

The Grand Duke wanted immediate action and sent Krudner an order to "Attack at the earliest possible moment." Krudner responded by telegraph, saying that he had but 26,000 men and 186 artillery pieces, and the Turks had 50,000 men and unknown artillery at Plevna. The Grand Duke messaged back that his own intelligence was certain that there were only 27,000 Turks at Plevna and for Krudner to, "Attack at once!"

General Michael Skobeleff of the 11th Corps was assigned to reconnoiter in strength and try to dislodge the Turks from Lovatz (modem name, Lovech), which is locat­ed about 20 miles south of Plevna on the Osma River. He observed large numbers of Turks but avoided serious con­tact, and, more importantly, he failed to recognize that the Turks in the Plevna region now outnumbered the Russians who were going to be sent against them.

By July 30th, Krudner had received more ammunition and supplies and was ready to mount the attack demanded by the Grand Duke. A two-pronged attack on the north and eastern approaches to Plevna would consist of a left flank force having Maj. Gen. Skobeleff at the extreme end with one brigade of Cossacks plus one battalion of horse-drawn artillery with 16 guns. The inner left flank was commanded by Prince Schachowskoi and had two brigades of infantry plus two squadrons of lancers and 48 guns. Two squadrons of lancers provided links between these left flank groups.

On the extreme right flank was Maj. Gen. Loscharef with one regiment and one horse battery of six guns. The inner right flank was commanded by Lt. Gen. Veliaminof and consisted of two divisions of infantry with 80 guns. Another two squadrons of lancers would act as links between the two right flank groups. Gen. Krudner would personally keep control of the reserves (between the flanks), which con­sisted of one infantry brigade and four squadrons of lancers and dragoons, as well as one horse battery of 30 guns.

Besides being outnumbered, the Russians had fatal defects in their plan. The two groups were too far apart to be of assistance to each other once the action commenced. Also, Osman Pasha had carefully placed his lines of trenches in undulating terrain, and attacking forces could not actually see the second and third lines of trenches until they would crest the various hills and ridges, at which time they were then exposed to rifle and cannon fire while the defend­ers remained well protected (see battle map of Plevna defenses).

from Man At Arms Magazine, Volume 19, Number Four, August, 1997) (copyright Man at Arms, 1997, Permission for use requested) This drawing could be downloaded and expanded for additional detail.

On the morning of July 30th, an artillery duel commenced and did not end until 3:00 p.m., when the Russians started their main troop advances. On the extreme left flank, Gen. Skobeleff got to within 600 yards of the Plevna out­skirts and started to fire his artillery when heavy long-range rifle fire caused so many casualties that he withdrew beyond their range and view. Prince Schachowskoi advanced to the village of Radisovo and killed the handful of Turks found there. Although his orders were to take the village and await new orders, he and his men were excited at their easy success. At 2:00 p.m., the Prince sent a message to Skobeleff saying that he was taking the offensive with his two brigades. This was the moment for which Osman Pasha's riflemen had been trained. The Prince lined up his two brigades and ordered them forward towards the Turkish trench line.

Russian reporters and military analysts later said that these troops began taking hits from the Peabody-Martinis at 3,000 yards, but this must be considered an exaggeration. What was really happening was a plunging high trajectory fire that was being accurately adjusted to keep pace with the oncoming infantry (see note below for a discussion of "plunging fire"). Men were falling in fair numbers at 2,000 yards, and the losses increased as they marched ever closer to their goal atop the hills of Plevna.

The Russian infantry accepted these losses in their usual stoic manner, but by the time they were 600-700 yards from the Turks, they began to unravel and break up into clusters. Some groups lay down to avoid the hail of lead and were goaded to their feet by their officers who valiantly urged them onwards. The concussion of Turkish rifle fire was constant and was augmented by Turkish artillery firing shrapnel shells into the Russian line. As the Turk officers called out each new range change, the riflemen adjusted their sights and poured forth more bullets in the general direction of the Russian line. The Winchesters lay next to many of them, fully loaded with 14 rounds. A box of 500 rounds was placed next to each repeating rifle, and other ammunition reserves were close at hand.

Still they came forward, these obedient Russian sol­diers, until they reached a point 200 yards from the Turkish trench line, when the order was given for the Turkish artillery, to cease fire and the riflemen to pick up their Winchesters and commence rapid fire. As the Winchesters spewed forth their rapid fire fusillade of lead, Russians fell in greater numbers than before. Still they came forward, bayonets fixed, ready to impale their oppressors in the trenches. According to prior plans, the Turks stopped shoot­ing when the Russians were about 50 yards from the trench line, and they now abandoned their first line of trenches and ran back into their second trench line, where they commenced their rifle fire all over again. The Russian advance stalled and took cover in the Turkish first line of trenches.

Prince Schachowskoi received a message that Gen. Krudner was sending a regiment to reinforce him, but they lost their way and never arrived in time to help. At 4:00 p.m., he could hold himself back no longer and ordered his remaining troops to charge the second line of trenches. The long-range Peabody-Martinis started their deadly plunging fire again, and Russians fell in large numbers as they worked their way uphill. closer to the second line. Once more the Winchesters took up the close-range fight, sending their wall of hot lead, decimating the oncoming infantry line. In a few places, Russians managed to get into the second line trench­es and, surprisingly, two companies actually got into Plevna itself, but Osman threw strong reserves into these points and drove them back.

By 6:00 p.m.. both flanks of the Russians had ended their attacks, but in desperation, Gen. Krudner sent his reserves, the Serpoukhof Regiment, into action near the center. These gallant men caught plunging fire as soon as they formed up their lines, and not one got closer than 100 yards of the Turk first trench line. Their leader, General Bojerianof. was hit near the 100 yard markers and was car­ried back by those of his personal guard who were still unhurt.

By 7:00 p.m., the Turks had full control of their second line trenches and attacked the now retreating forces of Prince Schachowskoi. who had no men available to act as a rear guard. The Prince sent a message to Gen. Skobeleff on his left. It read, "Extricate yourself as best you can. My companies (originally 200 strong) are coming back 5 and 10 men strong!" His personal guard had all been slain, and he kept around himself a small group of Cossacks. He man­aged to escape back to the Russian encampment four miles north of Plevna. His remaining soldiers were literally being driven before the Turkish rifle fire, causing the Russians to abandon three artillery pieces, all their wagons and their wounded (whom the Turks killed off during the night, as they took no prisoners).

News reporters wrote "...to find another instance of a corps being so rapidly destroyed as those the Russians used here, one has to go back to some of the frightful slaughters in the wars of the First French Empire." An official Russian report stated, "Turkish rifle fire was infernal on the flanks and center and seemed to in­crease greatly as our men neared the trenches." Thus ended the Second Battle of Plevna. Losses were reported to be 169 officers and 7,136 men. This represents 30 percent of the 26,000 that Gen. Krudner sent into battle.

The Grand Duke Nicholas was appalled and frustrated while Czar Alexander II messaged his demand for a successful attack to eliminate the stalemate at Plevna and to get the entire army moving again on all fronts. An army of Romanians had now joined the forces that Krudner had at Plevna. Rearmed, resupplied and rest­ed, the combined Russo-Romanian forces now numbered 80,000 men (later to increase to 150,000). These were divided into two 40,000-man groups, and one group was held back as a reserve. Those in the attack­ing group were ordered to move forward as close as possi­ble and to dig entrenchments and artillery positions on the north, south and east sides of Plevna. On the morning of Sept. 7th, they commenced a massive artillery bombard­ment which they maintained for four and one half days until noon on September 11th.

Turkish reports stated that this cannonade was totally ineffective and caused virtually no casualties or irreparable damage to their positions. The Turks were quite correct on this matter. Infantry in zig-zag trenches 15 inches wide could not be effectively harmed by shrapnel from shells that exploded in the ground. Only a direct hit could kill and wound, and then only in that immediate trench area.

At noon, the Third Battle of Plevna started much the same way that the others had, except for one difference. The Peabody-Martinis started killing the allied reserves that were gathered a few hundred yards behind the actual line of attacking units, over 1,000 yards from the Turkish riflemen! Turkish artillery and long-ranging Peabody-Martinis cut down large numbers of allied infantry long before they managed to reach the first trench line of the Turks. As before, the Winchesters did their remarkable job at the clos­er ranges. It was a repeat of battles number one and two. Krudner and his ranking advisors had seemingly learned nothing from their earlier mistakes.

The Gravitza Ridge Redoubt No.1 (see Plevna battle map) had been a particularly important goal to Gen. Krudner, and after hours of bloody attacks (and massive losses), the Russian infantry finally managed to push out the Turkish defenders and raise their own flag over this redoubt. However, once they had filled it with their troops -- courtesy of Osman Pasha, who withheld artillery and rifle fire until plenty of Russians were inside -- they found to their dismay that they could not stay there. Another Turkish redoubt (Gravitza No. 2, which had been silent and unsuspected) was located above and only 300 yards from Gravitza No.1, and the Turks were now pouring a torrent of rifle fire right into the Russian troops, who found no place inside that gave them any protection. The Russians had no other choice; the order was given to retreat from this redoubt that had just been captured at high cost. Gen. Skobeleff, seeing this flight and failing to recognize the cause, ordered his own reserves forward to try to stop the widespread retreat unfolding before him. His efforts came to nothing when Turkish artillery and riflemen stopped his troops before they had gone 500 yards. The General himself had to retreat to the rear with his IV Corps troops in order to save himself.

The Third Battle of Plevna is usually recorded as having ended the night of Sept. 11, 1877, by which time the Russians had lost another 300 officers and 12,500 men, and their Romanian allies had lost 56 officers and 2,500 men. The battle was not quite over because Gen. Skobeleff, in a gallant effort to obtain some measure of success that day, had now pushed his 15,000 men against the southeastern redoubts Numbers 14 and 15, and, after sustaining severe losses, managed to occupy these two that were nearest to the center of the town. While all the other allied forces were retreating with heavy losses for the day, Skobeleff hung on for 24 hours, pleading for reinforcements that never arrived. On the afternoon of Sept. 12th, he reluctantly evacuated these redoubts, having sustained casualties of 53 percent (8,000 men). This, then, marked the end of the Third (and final) Battle of Plevna, but not the end of fighting in the area.

By October 19th, Romanian sappers had wormed their way to within 40 yards of Gravitza Redoubt Number 2 and were begging their commander, Prince Charles, to allow them to attack. Unwilling to dampen the eagerness of his troops, the Prince consented. The Romanians hurled them­selves at the redoubt in huge numbers, expecting to take it with the overwhelming rush of manpower. From the previ­ously "quiet" redoubt, there blazed forth a volume of rifle fire such as had never been experienced by any soldier. The Turks had expected such an attack and had, in fact, been taunting the Romanians by sniping and throwing clods of dirt down onto them for weeks. Osman had specially rein­forced this redoubt with Winchester shooters because it was so close to the enemy line, and had also modified the layout so that it consisted of three tiers of rifle pits, one above the other, which enabled them to bring an unprecedented 20,000 shots per minute to bear upon the area being assailed.

The Romanians endured this enormous rain of bullets long enough to carry into the first level of rifle pits, but after 20 minutes, they were forced to retreat, leaving over 1,000 of their comrades dead on the slopes. This 25-minute action appears to have satisfied their need to come into closer contact with their Turkish enemies, as they no longer begged for permission to repeat the assault on Redoubt No. 2.

Europe, and most other parts of the world, had been following "The Plevna Delay," as it was being called in the newspapers. Reporters marveled at the fact that so few Turks were holding up the entire Russian offensive. The value of the rapid-firing Winchesters was never properly recognized by the press or non-Turkish military men, but in many war rooms around the world, decisions were later made to replace outdated big bore rifles with faster shoot­ing rifles of smaller caliber and higher muzzle velocity. The Turkish High Command placed an immediate order with Winchester for another 140,000 repeating rifles. These gen­erals had no need for further tests and trials. They knew what worked.

The Russians managed to capture the town of Lovatz to the south, and this effectively encircled the Plevna area and cut off Turkish supply caravans. Food, fuel, ammunition, medical supplies, blankets, uniforms, shoes and everything else an army needs failed to arrive, and by December, things were desperate inside Plevna. Disease and enemy action had taken the lives of 10,000 Turkish soldiers, and Osman had just 40,000 men remaining to face the nearly 150,000 well-supplied allied troops.

On the night of December 9th. Osman distributed to each of his men 150 rounds of ammunition, three days rations and a pair of sandals. This was all he had to give. All the cannon not being taken were spiked and their ammuntion buried. A bridge was secretly thrown across the River Vid, alongside an existing stone bridge, so as to permit a more rapid movement of troops across this river. Four thousand sick and wounded men were to remain in the Plevna infirmary, but all the doctors and nurses moved out with the army.

After dark, the Turkish forces started to quietly with­draw from the positions that they had held since July and silently massed at the River Vid. At 3:00 a.m., Gen. Skobeleff learned from Turkish deserters what was happening. He sent a small detachment up into the Turkish redoubts, and after they had explored sufficiently, they reported back to Skobeleff, who immediately informed the Grand Duke, at Bogot, and General Todleben, at Tucenica (by telegraph), that Plevna was being evacuated by the Turkish army. All allied forces were put on alert, but, as yet, there was no indi­cation as to where the Turks would appear.

Osman Pasha divided his force into two corps of 20,000 each. His plan was to attack the Russian lines two miles west of the fiver on the Sophia Road and, eventually, to march to Milkovatz where he could be resupplied and again make a stand. His reserve, Second Corps, was told to stay near the river and guard his rear for "two hours" and then come up fast, to join with the First Corps.

On the morning of December 10th, the Turkish First Corps started the two-mile charge towards the Russian positions under incessant artillery fire -- and without benefit of their own artillery to respond. Shrapnel and grapeshot felled Turks in large numbers, while their line advanced silently at double-quick time for two miles on an open plain, without firing a single shot in retaliation. Osman Pasha led his men at the front of their line, astride his chestnut stallion. In 45 minutes they were into the first line of Russian trenches, which they overwhelmed quickly and, then, without pause, charged forward to take the sec­ond line as well as two artillery earthworks, each containing eight field pieces. General Stroukoff had been sent to bring up a full division of grenadiers, and at his timely arrival with these reinforcements, the Russians regained their composure and did not yield any more terrain to the now weary Turks.

It was now 8:30 a.m., and Osman Pasha realized that he had made a fatal mistake in not having his Second Corps follow earlier. With his full army, he surely could have forced his way through the remaining Russian defenses. The Russian troops threw themselves upon the exhausted Turks, and the most furious hand-to-hand fighting raged with heavy casualties on both sides, but the Russians were now the ones with overwhelming superiority of numbers. The big guns were retaken as were the two trench lines, and seven guns that the Turks had brought from their starting point at the river. At this time, the two armies were only 200-300 yards apart, keeping up a heavy fire upon one another but making no attempt to close in. Osman's horse was killed, and the bullet wounded him in the calf of his right leg. News of his falling spread rapidly amongst the Turks and somehow became distorted to the affect that Osman was dead. The same battalions that an hour earlier had fought with a frenzied valor now began to fall back towards the River Vid. Seeing this panic, the Russians renewed their own attack on the fleeing Turks, who were soon jamming their way through throngs of civilians and their carts that clogged the narrow Sophia Road.

At 10:00 a.m., the Turkish Second Corps started west­ward as planned, but immediately encountered the First Corps retreating towards them. Russian artillery was shelling the area with salvos of shrapnel, and the Turks had no place to hide on the open plain. For three more hours, they milled around in this exposed area. taking continuous shellfire and many losses. The Turks replied as well as they could with their own few field pieces.

At 1:00 p.m., as if by mutual agreement, the cannons ceased their work and an eerie quietness settled upon the region. Both sides expected the other to make another charge attack, but it had not happened. The Turks began to realize their hopeless situation. The enemy in front was now overwhelmingly superior in manpower. Behind them, Russians and Romanians now occupied the defenses of Plevna, and Osman Pasha and his weary soldiers were trapped and dying in an open area, running low on ammunition and hope.

A white flag appeared and a blindfolded Turkish officer was seen going across the bridge towards Plevna, with a Russian escort troop. General Ganetsky refused to deal with him when he learned he was only a junior officer. Fifteen minutes later, a second Turkish officer was also refused and was sent back with a note written in French saying that because Ganetsky knew the Field Marshall was wounded. he would only deal with an officer who personally repre­sented Osman Pasha. However, in a few minutes, Gen. Skobeleff himself arrived at the bridge with 30 of his staff, who waved white handkerchiefs at the Turkish soldiers standing on both sides of the road. Turkish officers replied by waving a large white object to signify their understanding.

Osman sent out his Chief of Staff, Tevik Pasha, who stated to Skobeleff that the Turkish army would surrender but, due to his wound, Osman could not come out in person from the small house in which he was now lying. Ganetsky agreed to be escorted to the house where Osman surren­dered his sword and was asked to tell his army to lay down their weapons. A member of his staff, Adil Pasha, was sent to a nearby hill where he could be heard telling the men in his loudest voice that it was all over and to lay down their arms. Riding in a carriage on his way back to Plevna, Osman was greeted by the Grand Duke Nicholas who said, "I congratulate you on your defense of Plevna. It is one of the most splendid exploits in history." The next morning at a huge breakfast gathering, the Grand Duke returned Osman Pasha's sword as a final tribute to this worthy, history making adversary! Field Marshal Osman Pasha was interned comfortably in Russia for the duration of the war, which the Turks eventually lost in 1878.

(unsigned, but User:CristianChirita placed this here 25 March 2005)

not "merge"

I agree not to be merged. On the above reasons. Bonaparte talk 18:26, 2 January 2006 (UTC)

Turkish and Russian History categories

I think it's not particularly useful to place this article in the categories History of Turkey and History of Russia. The war had nothing to do with the modern state of Turkey, it was a war of liberation against the Ottoman Empire, and it is already placed in the Category "Wars of the Ottoman Empire", a subset of the Ottoman Empire category. As to placing it in the History of Russia, the war indeed wasn't fought against Russia, and didn't have any particularly significant contribution to Russian history considering that it was a war of Romania's independence (and not Romania's independence from Russia, in any case). I find it odd then that Romanians are the ones now favouring putting it into a Russian History category. Now, why are there two disputed tags at the head of the article? What particular facts are either POV or not accurate? I don't think you can argue this whole article is POV, since the term "Romanian War of Independence" does exist and should hence have an article. Ronline ✉ 11:20, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

Dude, Wallachia and Moldavia were not the modern state of Ro, yet what transpired in their history, counts as Romanian history. The same with the Ottomans: the Russo-Turkish War is called Turkish, even though it was against the Ottoman Empire; and they have the Turkish history category there. What's the difference here? It was a direct conflict between Ro and the Ottoman Empire, and should count as part of the Turkish history. I will readd the Turkish category. I'm not sure why the Russian category is said to not fit in this article. The Russians were involved, therefore, they fit in the category. To me, it's that simple. --Candide, or Optimism 13:49, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

Read WP:CAT before wikilawyering. We should use more specific cats. Category:Wars of Russia is the only cat this article could fit in. But it doesn't, because Russia was not a belligerent in this war. It was not "War of Russia". Please find something more useful than waging such silly revert wars. --Ghirla ^-трёп- 14:24, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

Well, you and Bonny started the revert war. To me, this conflict is another name for Russo-Turkish War, with the only difference that it focuses more on the Ro perspective. --Candide, or Optimism 14:42, 25 April 2006 (UTC)

POV?

There is a POV tag on this, but no remark that I see indicating what is considered to be the POV problem. Would someone please explain here what the issue is? Lacking an explanation, I think the tag should be removed. - Jmabel | Talk 05:16, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

The problem is that the article alleges that Plevna was taken by Carol I (what the Skobelev Park is all about then??) and that "Romania won the war", whereas in reality it was one of many subsidiary forces helping the Russians. We don't need nationalist megalomania here. --Ghirla ^-трёп- 07:02, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

I guess "Carol I accepted, and became the commander of both the Romanian and Russian troops, conquering Plevna after heavy fighting" should be rephrased. Carol was the commander of the Romanian and Russian forces at Plevna ONLY; and Plevna was conquered by the joint Russian-Romanian forces, which it is not made very clear in the phrase above. As for the "Russia did not keep its promises of the April 1877 treaty to respect Romania's territorial integrity", see the Romanian-Russian Convention of April 4/16, 1877. I couldn't find the complete text of this treaty. Here's link to a page where the treaty is mentioned (Romania promised to the Russian army 'free passage through Romanian territory and the treatment due to a friendly army'; whilst Russia undertook to respect Romania's political rights, as well as 'to maintain and defend her actual integrity'): [1] Mentatus 08:14, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

We were promised Silistra, which was not given to us. --Candide, or Optimism 14:26, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

Neutral sources, please? Who officially "promised" it? Can you cite a document? Russians expected much from the war, too, but look how the Western powers crippled our achivements during the Congress of Berlin... --Ghirla ^-трёп- 15:17, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

2nd article of the Convention held on the 4th of April, saying that: "It is never to be agreed on giving away of any part of our country, neither for another part of land, nor for any other compensation." The Document was signed by Michael Kogalniceanu from romanian sideCristianChirita 15:42, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

some details in page 105 http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/dhh/downloads/Official_Histories/Coll_21st_Peacekeeping.pdf

Translation

I've done my best to translate the Romanian sentence that was in a note; would someone else please check my translation. I suspect I may have been overly literal in translating "Rog sã faci fuziune, demonstratiune…", but I couldn't see what else to do with it. - Jmabel | Talk 06:18, 6 July 2006 (UTC)

I changed the phrase "The Turks massed together the greatest troop at Pleven to lay us waste" to "The Turks, massing together the largest army at Pleven, are laying us waste. There are two subtle differences: the first is the usage of largest(to suggest great numbers) instead of greatest(which suggests best trained), holding true to the original Romanian text. The second is the use of the gerund form of "to lay" and "to mass", as to respect the original meaning in Romanian.(Vlad.teo (talk) 10:16, 28 February 2012 (UTC))

Merge

There is no reason in hell why this articles should be separate. If all Russian exaggeration claims that there was no notable Romanian presence, all Romanian exaggeration will surely not make these "separate wars"! If the fear is that "events important to Romania" will get lost in the move, then just keep this as a non-repetitive section of the bigger article. Dahn 13:08, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

I totally agree. The Romanian contribution to the war should be covered in a section WITHIN the Russo-Turkish War, 1877–1878 article. Mentatus 08:01, 29 September 2006 (UTC)

How about, when it comes to the events around Plevna, to say See Romanian War of Independence, i.e. to give link to the other article? Just asking. Both options seem to me equal, so I would like to hear some pros and contras (in one sentence each, preferably).:Dc76 21:44, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Pros: We have a precedent (from the article point of view): the Romanian participation to the World War II is covered separately (see Romania during World War II).

Cons: This article presents mainly the operations of the Romanian Army during the war as if the Romanians had fought it independently.

My conclusion: Move the military details to Russo-Turkish War, 1877–1878 and outline the main events in the Kingdom of Romania article. Mentatus 22:02, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

It seems that the suggestion to merge this article into the Russo-Turkish War, 1877–1878 has been ignored for the last 5 months, so I would like to submit this issue again to the interested Wikipedians (the referenda are quite popular in Romania nowadays :): to merge or not to merge? Mentatus 10:53, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Merge. Only too logical (if need be, one could mention the same article under "War of Independence" title in articles involving Romania/Romanians). I would also like to point out that the WWII example is a stretch: not only is WWII massive, but the "Romania during..." actually serves to summarize information on the political situation (which was murky and otherwise problematic to link to). Dahn 22:18, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

I agree it was a stretch, but it was the only reasonable pro-argument I could think of on the spot :) Mentatus 22:55, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Merge. Ok, if that is the only logical reason pro [separate article], then I support the merge. The idea to use War of Independence in some articles when this name is used in sourses, is also good. I don't see a problem if they will link to a redirect page.:Dc76 23:43, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Renewed call for a merger

The fact that this article exists as a separate one form Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) is called content forking, and editors who are responsible for this have thus been causing disruption. In the meantime, this article keeps getting more and more inventive (just check out the glittering infobox). I call on users to be rational and accept that maintaining two articles on the same topic is not what wikipedia is about. Dahn 10:04, 12 November 2007 (UTC)

I think this one is more focused on the Romanian offensive. It could be much bigger with some decent references. There are 2 leaders on the left (Romania and Russia) and 2 on the right (Turkish). It's the same structure as in Battle of Posada, for example, but double... --Alex:Dan (talk) 23:16, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

What I ment to say is that if someone would take care of this article, and expand it, it shouldn't be merged. --Alex:Dan (talk) 23:21, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

It still would be a content fork, since the two wars were actually one. Dahn (talk) 23:31, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

It's just another perspective... I'm talking about expandind the subject "Romania in Russo-Turkish war", with this title or "Romanian War of Independence". I think the only major problem in establishing the title is that the 1877-1878 war is known as the Russo-Turkish and not the Russo-Romanian-Turkish one. Let's not forget that without Romanian help and comandship, the results probably would have differ. Otherwise it shouldn't be a problem, because we say "Romania in WWI" and not "Războiul de Reîntregire al Neamului" (The War of Reuniting the [Romanian] Kind". --Alex:Dan (talk) 18:20, 24 November 2007 (UTC)

While I have to bring up the fact that this article needs serious copyediting, I will agree to the approach you outline above, since it does look like a reasonable alternative. Note, however, that this would still imply a merger of some sort: the article will have to be summarized there (and I would recommend doing so after a cleanup), and this should be linked as a "main article" for that section. Dahn (talk) 18:27, 24 November 2007 (UTC)

My two cents: Although I agree that the two wars are one and the same, I still think the subject (Romanian Independence) merits a separate article. After all, it was a momentous event in the history of that country (spawning, if nothing else, an important body of artwork!) -- why make it a subset of just another war between Russia and Turkey? I don't have the perfect answer, but how about trying to have one article concentrate more on the geopolitical (and perhaps more on the purely military, yet not Romania-related) aspects of the war, while the other more on the Romanian context, and on the impact the war had on the history and culture of Romania? This is already the case, to some extent, but maybe the necessary revisions and copy-editing can be done with this goal in mind (at least in part). In the end, there still would be some unavoidable overlap, but perhaps this could be minimized, in order to avoid the content forking issue? Turgidson (talk) 20:25, 24 November 2007 (UTC)

If we split the hair, Romania never signed an alliance treaty with Russia, it kinda fought its own war... --Alex:Dan (talk) 22:39, 24 November 2007 (UTC)

I think this whole article should be mentioned in russo turkish war as romanian frontier or sth like that. or the name of this article should be romanians in russo turkish war. otherwise this is just a nationalistic view of the russo turkish war.

And I would like to point that there is no article in wiki named bulgarian war of independence. Both bulgarians and romanians took part in the very same war, they both were liberated. however we do have a article named liberation of bulgaria which only talks about the events that led to the liberation of bulgarians before and after russo turkish war.

wiki is not the place to show your nationalism. here, we only speak the truth.

Niyeti bozuk http nesnesi (talk) 14:10, 1 December 2012 (UTC)

Romania did not fight its own war. It simply acted as an auxiliary for the Russians. There were no separate Romanian campaigns - the Romanians fought alongside the Russians in the Siege of Plevna, which was the main operation of the war. This article as currently written is deeply misleading, because it doesn't give much context for how Romanian efforts fit into the larger war. It absolutely is a content fork. One could theoretically imagine an article called Romania in the Russo-Turkish War which would be worthwhile, but this is not that article. This is like if we had an article called the Ottoman-Sardinian War that described Sardinian participation in the siege of Sevastopol with only the barest amount of context to the Crimean War as a whole. It's one thing to have a separate article about distinct campaigns that are separate from the main part of the war under a local name for the war. It's quite another thing to describe incidents in the Siege of Plevna as though they form a separate war from the Russian part of the same siege. john k (talk) 14:41, 24 September 2015 (UTC)

Participants

The Russian army had many volunteers (Bulgarian, Circasian, Finns etc.). Moreover, this edit was done by a user named "Avitohol" [[2]]. Notice that in the process of adding the "Bulgarian volunteers" (?) he also made some other changes. Ohh, never mind. It's just my ultranationalistical mind. How can I accuse my fellow wikipedian with the name of a Bulgar khan of something sleazy? Must definetly be my ultranationalistic mind. I've reverted back my edits. Au revoir and I leave you all in this cloaca. You're not worthy of my attention. Stari sa (talk) 19:06, 3 March 2008 (UTC)

Grivitsa

http://www.jurnalul.ro/special/cine-a-luat-steagul-turcesc-de-la-grivita-eroii-de-la-1877-balacariti-in-presa-de-acum-100-de-ani-601292.htm

Wrong Nikolai?

Isn't this the wrong Grand Duke Nikolai? Nikolai Constantinovich was only 27 in 1877, and his wikipedia article only notes him as a well known womanizer. Surely the Grand Duke Nikolai in question is his uncle, Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich of Russia (1831–1891), who was commander-in-chief of Russian forces during the war with Turkey? john k (talk) 14:28, 24 September 2015 (UTC)

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Bias Aftermath Result

changed some of the opinionated pieces in the aftermath result, stating that "Russia never wanted to protect, liberate, etc. Romania and just wanted to take over territory for its selfish needs". This type of wording doesn't belong in a encyclopedia. 149.62.206.220 (talk) 12:46, 18 September 2023 (UTC)